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theory underlying the individual welfare gains available from annuitizing resources in retirement. It
then contrasts these findings with the empirical findings that so few consumers behave in a manner
that is consistent with them placing a high value on annuities. After reviewing the strengths and weaknesses
of the large literature that seeks to reconcile these findings through richer extensions of the basic model,
this paper turns to a somewhat more speculative discussion of potential behavioral stories that may
be limiting demand. Overall, the paper argues that while further extensions to the rational consumer
model of annuity demand are useful for helping to clarify under what conditions annuitization is welfare-enhancing,
at least part of the answer to why consumers are so reluctant to annuitize will likely be found through
a more rigorous study of the various psychological biases that individuals bring to the annuity decision.
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 “ … It is a well known fact that annuity contracts, other than in the form of group insurance 
through pension systems, are extremely rare.  Why this should be so is a subject of considerable 
current interest.  It is still ill-understood.”  Franco Modigliani, Nobel Prize acceptance speech, 
December 9, 1985, Stockholm, Sweden.
1   
 
1.  Introduction 
 
  Individuals engaged in financial planning for retirement have no shortage of resources 
available to provide guidance on how much to save and how to invest those savings.  If one does 
a Google search on the term “retirement planning,” the lion’s share of the over 1.2 million hits 
appear to guide one to websites that discuss various features of the saving and investment 
decisions.  Given the dominant focus on saving and investment, the typical worker could be 
forgiven for believing that “retirement planning” is synonymous with “wealth accumulation.”   
  While wealth accumulation is an important ingredient in any financial plan, it is not 
sufficient to ensure financial well-being in retirement.  A particularly glaring shortcoming of the 
focus on wealth accumulation is that it fails to consider how one’s assets will be converted into a 
stream of consumption in retirement.  A comprehensive retirement planning strategy requires 
that one think more than about how to save: it also requires thinking about how to spend. 
Converting wealth into consumption is made difficult by the various risks facing 
individuals, such as uncertainty about how long one will live.  Life annuities are financial 
contracts designed to insure against the financial risk created by length-of-life uncertainty by 
allowing an individual to exchange a lump-sum of wealth for an income stream that is 
guaranteed to last for the rest of the annuitant’s life.  While life annuities play an important role 
in the economics literature, the insurance features of life annuities appear to be poorly 
understood and/or “under-valued” by the general public, as evidenced by the very small size of 
the market.  Many financial planning calculators simply ignore uncertainty about length-of-life, 
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or handle it in a naïve way, such as by creating a financial plan with a horizon equal to one’s 
average remaining life expectancy plus five or ten years.  Because these approaches ignore 
uncertainty, the retirement planning process becomes framed in a manner that does not provide a 
clear role for insurance against low consumption at advanced ages.  Anecdotal evidences 
suggests that the lack of clarity on the benefits of annuities in reducing longevity risk also applies 
to financial planners and others who are engaged in the business of advising clients on how to 
prepare for retirement.   
This paper examines the role of annuities in the financial planning process, including 
both the normative judgment about what role annuities “should” play (as guided by economic 
theory), as well as empirical evidence about the role that annuities actually do play.  A key point 
is that there is a large gap between these two perspectives: much of the economics literature 
suggests that most individuals would find annuities welfare enhancing, and yet the empirical 
evidence suggests that individuals do not act as if they value them very highly.  The economic 
literature that seeks to solve this annuity puzzle within a strictly rational framework has 
uncovered some important insights.  To more fully understand why consumers behave as if they 
do not value annuities, however, it appears that the literature may need to move beyond the fully 
rational paradigm.  The paper discusses several working hypotheses about behavioral biases that 
may influence annuity demand, while recognizing that these hypotheses have not yet been 
adequately tested in the literature.  The paper concludes with a discussion of new developments 
in the annuity market that may overcome some of these demand limitations in the future.     
   4
2.  Uncertain Lifetimes and the Role of Annuities 
  In a world of certainty, financial planning for retirement would be easy: an individual 
could simply spread their wealth over a fixed time horizon.  For example, an individual who 
prefers equal consumption in every period could simply amortize his wealth to provide constant 
real income each month until precisely running out of wealth on the last day of life.   
  In reality, of course, an individual faces several significant sources of uncertainty, 
including uncertainty about how long he will live, future expenditure needs (such as for 
uninsured medical expenses), and future real rates of return, among others.  The financial 
implication of length-of-life uncertainty is that an individual must balance the risk of consuming 
too aggressively, which runs the risk of resulting in a large consumption drop at advanced ages, 
against the risk of consuming too conservatively, which will subject him to a lower of level of 
consumption than he could otherwise afford.    
Life annuities are designed to eliminate longevity risk by allowing an individual to 
exchange a lump-sum of wealth for a stream of payments that continue so long as the individual 
(and possibly a spouse) is alive.  Economic theory suggests that life annuities can substantially 
increase individual welfare by eliminating the financial risks associated with uncertain lifetimes 
and providing consumers with a higher level of lifetime consumption.  One early and influential 
study showed that in the absence of bequest motives, risk averse individuals would find it 
optimal to annuitize 100 percent of their wealth.
2   
To understand this result, consider an individual without a bequest motive who cares only 
about his consumption in the current period and one period hence.  If this individual invests 
$1,000 in a non-annuitized asset with a rate of return 8 percent, then next period he will be able 
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to consume $1,080.  On the other hand, if the individual invests $1 in an annuity, and if with 
probability 0.03 the individual will not survive to receive the payment next period, then the 
insurer is able to pay $1,080/(1-0.03) = $1,102 to the annuitant, conditional on survival.  The 
extra return provided to surviving annuitants is sometimes called the “mortality premium” or 
“mortality credit,” because it is provided in return for giving up one’s right to the wealth upon 
death.
3  For an individual who does not value bequests, the fact that the rate of return on the 
annuity is greater than the rate of return on the non-annuitized asset for individuals who survive.  
This potential for higher returns can be seen in figure 1, which shows the amount of 
income that would be available to an individual under several alternative strategies for 
converting one’s nest egg into retirement income.  The “annuity” line shows the $7,704 of 
annual income that would be available for life to a 65-year-old man who purchased a standard 
life annuity contract with an initial premium of $100,000.
4  This strategy is then compared to 
three alternatives.  The “self-annuitization” alternative shows an individual who invests his 
$100,000 in a non-annuitized account earning the market rate of interest but who consumes the 
same $7,704 per year in income that the life annuity would have provided.  Because this 
individual is not benefiting from the mortality premium, this strategy is unsustainable: he would 
run out of money at age 85. 
  The “amortization” line shows another in which the individual invests his wealth at the 
going market interest rate and “amortizes” it (i.e., spreads it evenly) over 35 years, from age 65 
to 100.
 5  This strategy provides income that is nearly 25 percent lower than that provided by the 
annuity.  Furthermore, the amortization strategy still imposes some risk; in the event that the 
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individual lives beyond age 100, he would have no money left to consume under this approach, 
whereas he would still have income if he had purchased a life annuity.   
  The “1 / LE,” or “one divided by life expectancy,” line shows what happens if an 
individual follows a more “sophisticated” draw-down strategy that is similar to one of the 
methods permitted by the IRS for meeting minimum distribution requirements from qualified 
pension plans.  In particular, the strategy is based on consuming a fraction of remaining wealth 
that is proportional to the individual’s remaining life expectancy.
6  The important feature of this 
approach is that, once again, the income stream is always lower than that provided by a life 
annuity.  Indeed, the income from this approach never exceeds 94 percent of the annuity income 
level, and falls to less than 40 percent by the time a person is in his or her early 90s.     
  These stylized results extend to more complex models, at least so long as the market for 
annuities is sufficiently well developed that individuals can match the annuity payouts to their 
desired consumption levels across time and across various resolutions of uncertainty.
7  We know, 
of course, that the annuity market is not well-developed: for example, most annuities offered in 
the private sector lack inflation protection.
8  Nor is there a rich market for products that combine 
annuities with other forms of insurance, such as the combined annuity and long-term care 
product that has recently been suggested.
9  Still, simulations show that even when there is an 
extreme mismatch between the annuities provided by the market and the desired consumption 
path, a risk averse consumer would still find it optimal to annuitize the majority of his wealth.
10  
These simulations also show that while a bequest motive reduces the demand for annuities, it 
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does not eliminate it in general.  In short, the economic literature provides a strong theoretical 
foundation for the normative conclusion that annuities ought to be of substantial value to retirees.  
It also has the positive empirical implication that we should observe annuities comprising a large 
component of individual and household portfolios.     
 
3.  Do Consumers Behave as if they Value Annuities?   
  The empirical evidence on annuitization suggests that individuals do not behave as if they 
value annuities as highly as theory would predict.  This is evidenced by the fact that the private 
market for immediate annuities, or payout annuities, was only $11.8 billion in 2005.
11  Even this 
may overstate the size of the payout annuity market, as included in the immediate annuity figures 
are some period certain products that pay out for a specified number of years with no life 
contingency.
12  The conclusion that the market is small is supported by standard household data 
sets that are used to track asset ownership, such as the Survey of Consumer Finances or the 
Health and Retirement Study.  The frequency with which annuity owners appears in these data 
sets is so low that empirical work on private market annuity purchases in the U.S. has been 
severely limited.   
While annuitization is limited in the individual market, there has traditionally been a high 
level of annuitization provided through the group market via employer-sponsored pension plans.  
Over the last few decades, however, defined benefit plans have been steadily declining in 
importance relative to hybrid plans (e.g., cash balance plans) and defined contribution plans 
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(e.g., 401(k) plans).
13  As one study reports that as of 2002, “nearly all of the over 500” cash 
balance, or hybrid, plans offer lump-sum distributions as a payout option.
14  It is also well known 
that in many defined contribution plans, such as the 401(k), participants often do not even have 
the option of annuitizing.  For example, survey evidence of 401(k) plans sponsors conducted by 
Hewitt Associates found that the fraction of 401(k) plans offering annuities as a payout option 
feel from 31% in 1999 to only 17% in 2003.
15  Even in those DB plans that still exist, it is now 
very common for participants to have the option to take their benefits as a lump-sum.  Over half 
of all defined benefit plans now offer a lump-sum distribution at retirement.
16  As a result of 
these three factors, the Congressional Research reports that 85% of the 61.1 million workers age 
21 or older who were included in a retirement plan at work participated in a plan that offered a 
lump-sum distribution as a payment option.
17   
  With a tiny individual annuity market and a small and declining group annuity market, 
the only meaningful source of annuitization left in the U.S. today is the Social Security system.  
Evaluated solely as an annuity product, the Social Security benefit is quite good, in that it is 
inflation indexed (i.e., every January 1 benefits are increased by the amount of the Consumer 
Price Index) and provides spousal benefits.  While individuals are permitted to claim Social 
Security benefits as early as age 62, they are not required to do so.  Individuals who delay 
claiming are essentially purchasing (at better-than-market prices) a larger inflation-indexed 
annuity for the future.  Research on benefit claiming behavior, however, suggests that very few 
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individuals avail themselves of this opportunity, with only 1 out of 10 men retiring before their 
62
nd birthday delay claiming benefits for at least a year.
18   
  While public support for the Social Security program has historically been high, new 
survey evidence suggests that many individuals would prefer to receive their benefit as a lump 
sum.  In an experimental module from the Health and Retirement Survey, approximately 1,000 
participants were asked the following question:
19 
Imagine you are 65 years old, and you are receiving $1000 per month in Social Security 
benefits. Suppose you were given the choice to lower that benefit by half, to $500 per 
month. This one-half benefit reduction will continue as long as you live. In return, you 
would be given a one-time, lump sum payment of $87,000. Would you take the $1000 
monthly benefit for life or the lower monthly benefit with the lump sum payment? 
For married households, the dollar amount of the lump sum was $80,000, reflecting the actuarial 
adjustment when switching from an individual to a joint-and-survivor annuity that Social 
Security provides to married couples. These amounts are approximately actuarially fair for an 
age-65 individual (the assumed age in the question), given average population mortality rates.  
Respondents were then asked a follow-up question that either increased or decreased the lump-
sum amount by approximately 25 percent.  Nearly 3 out of every 5 respondents stated a 
preference for the lump sum payment when it is priced at an actuarially fair level, and nearly 2 
out of every 5 respondents preferred the lump-sum even when it was 25 percent below its 
actuarial value.  Clearly, if the majority of respondents are willing to give up the best annuity 
they own for a lump sum that is worse than or equal to the actuarially fair level, most individuals 
are not behaving as if they place a high insurance value on the annuity. 
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Importantly, the limited degree of annuitization is not unique to the U.S.  A series of 
World Bank studies in 1999 examined annuity markets in Canada, the UK, Switzerland, 
Australia, Israel, Chile and Singapore.  The summary report states “annuities markets are still 
poorly developed in virtually all these countries.”
20 
  In addition to the puzzle that individuals do not annuitize as often as theory would 
predict, a secondary puzzle pertains to those who do annuitize: the prevalence of “guarantees.”  
The vast majority of private annuity products sold in the U.S. include guarantees, such as a “10 
year period certain” feature that promises that the annuitant and/or the policy beneficiary will 
receive at least 10 years of payments, even if the annuitant dies during that period.  This feature 
is somewhat puzzling in the standard life-cycle framework because it is easy to show that a life 
annuity with a 10-year period certain guarantee is simply a combination of a two distinct 
products: (i) a non-life contingent bond that pays back its principal plus interest over 10 years, 
and (ii) a life annuity with a deferred payout date of 10 years.
21  Given that the loads charged for 
annuities with a 10-year guarantee are not substantially different from the loads charged for 
products that are entirely life contingent, it is not clear why individuals want to purchase the first 
of these products at existing loads, when plenty of alternative investments exist that would 
provide a better payout at comparable risk for the period of the guarantee.  Another way to view 
this part of the annuity puzzle is that even when individuals are annuitizing, they are explicitly 
unraveling part of the annuity by including the guarantee.     
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4.  Can Rational Models Explain the Limited Demand for Annuities? 
  An extensive literature has developed in recent years attempting to explain the lack of 
annuitization within the framework of a fully rational, optimizing agent.  In this section, I argue 
that while it is possible to generate more limited annuitization by extending the rational model in 
several directions, such an approach does not seem to provide the complete answer to the puzzle.  
In some cases, the hypothesized explanations run counter to established empirical findings.  In 
other cases, the explanations reduce the theoretical demand for annuities, but not by enough to 
explain such low observed levels.  In still other cases, the explanations solve one puzzle at the 
expense of creating new ones.        
4.1 Adverse selection and high prices  
  It has been well-documented that annuity prices (payouts) tend to be higher (lower) than 
actuarially fair levels.  One commonly used metric for evaluating annuity prices is the “money’s 
worth” concept, which is simply defined as: 
emium Pr
Payouts of Value esent Pr Net Expected
Worth s ' Money =  
  The numerator is the sum of all future annuity payments, weighted by the probability that 
an individual will be alive to receive them and discounted back to present at a risk free interest 
rate.  The denominator is the premium paid for the annuity.  Thus, when the MW ratio is less 
than 1.0, it indicates that individual annuitants will, on average, receive less in annuity payments 
than they paid in premiums.  Analysis of market prices in 1999 found that the MW ratio for a 
single premium immediate annuity for a 65-year male in the U.S. was approximately 0.85 when 
evaluated using general population mortality and a Treasury yield curve.
22  By computing the 
MW separately using general population and annuitant mortality tables, studies show that most 
                                                 
22 Brown, Mitchell and Poterba (2002).   12
of the load (where load = 1-MW) arises from the fact that the mortality rates of annuitants is 
substantially below that of the general population.  These mortality differences reflect both 
adverse selection arising from private health information about expected longevity (i.e., “active” 
selection), as well as differences arising from the fact that annuitants tend to have higher income 
and wealth than non-annuitants, factors which are also correlated with mortality (i.e., “passive” 
selection”).
23  Several papers reinforce the idea that active selection may matter by showing that 
individuals with poor self-reported health are less likely to express an interest in annuitizing.
24  
More recently, several papers have argued that part of the annuity load may also arise from the 
fact that insurance companies are unable to adequately hedge aggregate mortality risk in the 
population, and therefore must charge a higher price to compensate for bearing this risk.
25 
  Regardless of the source of the price mark-up, however, the implicit assumption behind 
the belief that prices drive down annuity demand is that consumers are price sensitive, i.e., that 
they have a price elasticity of demand that is rather large (in absolute value).  Perhaps 
surprisingly, we have relatively little in the way of empirical estimates about the price elasticity 
of demand for annuities.
26  However, there are several pieces of data that suggest that existing 
loads are not the most important explanation of limited demand.  First, simulation work suggests 
that the loads are not large enough to offset the utility gains from annuitization.
27  Second, 
evidence suggests that few individuals are willing to postpone the claiming of Social Security 
benefits, despite the fact that the Social Security actuarial adjustments for early retirement are 
roughly actuarially fair on average.
28  Finally, a recent study finds that nearly 3/5 of the 
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population states a preference for a lump-sum to the Social Security annuity even when the 
trade-off is actuarially fair.
29  Of course, this study did find some evidence of price sensitivity: 
when the lump-sum was reduced to 25 percent below the actuarially fair level, the proportion 
preferring the lump-sum dropped from 59 percent to 37 percent.  In other words, a 33 percent 
(1/0.75) increase in the monthly annuity payout per dollar spent on the annuity is sufficient to 
induce only 1 out of 5 individuals to switch their stated preference from the lump-sum to the 
annuity.  Given that most estimates of the money’s worth of annuities in the private U.S. market 
suggest loads in the neighborhood of 10-15%, a simplistic linear extrapolation suggests that less 
than 10% of the population would switch to an annuity if they suddenly became offered at 
actuarially fair prices.   
  Another way to view the pricing problem is that it may create an incentive to delay 
annuitization.  Higher than actuarially fair prices, the irreversibility of the annuity contract and 
the potential arrival of asymmetric information may provide an advantage to delaying the 
purchase of annuities.
 30  For example, it may be optimal to delay annuitization if returns on 
investment in the future might exceed current returns, or if annuities purchased later in life are 
priced more favorably than those purchased earlier.  Relatedly, an “all-or-nothing” annuitization 
decision at a single point in time is sub-optimal, and that consumers would be better off initially 
annuitizing a lump-sum (if they do not already have this minimum level from pre-existing DB 
pensions like Social Security) and then gradually purchasing additional life annuities over time.
31  
Of course, while these models provide excellent guidance about how people “ought to” behave 
when faced with realistic institutional restrictions on the timing and type of annuitization, they 
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share the shortcoming of being unable to explain how people actually behave: empirically, we do 
not observe many households following a strategy of gradual annuitization at older ages.    
4.2 Pre-existing annuitization 
Given standard models of lifetime expected utility, the marginal value of additional 
annuitization typically declines with the amount of wealth already annuitized.  Numerous authors 
have made the point that high levels of pre-existing annuitization from Social Security or private 
defined benefit (DB) plans may lead to low demand for additional annuitization.
32    
For individuals at the low end of the wealth distribution, this explanation certainly rings 
true.  For example, the Social Security Administration states that 21% of married couples and 
43% of unmarried persons rely on Social Security for more than 90% of their income.
33  It 
should not be surprising that these households would not wish to annuitize what little savings 
they have remaining.  Higher up the wealth distribution, however, where Social Security 
represents a much smaller portion of wealth, it is more difficult to argue that all private annuity 
purchases are crowded out.  As recently noted, “it would be a miraculous coincidence if the 
optimal partial annuitization strategy equaled the amounts provided by Social Security and 
defined benefit pensions for the vast majority of retirees.”
34        
4.3 Risk sharing in couples 
  It has long been noted that families who share a common budget constraint can 
effectively substitute for a formal annuity market.
35  By pooling their resources, a married couple 
is able to capture a large share of the gains from a formal annuity market.  As a result of this risk 
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sharing potential, a couple’s willingness to pay for joint and survivor annuities is substantially 
lower than a single individual’s willingness to pay for an annuity.
36 
  One recent paper combines several of the preceding insights – high prices, high levels of 
pre-existing annuities, and risk sharing within couples – into a set of simulated annuity demands 
by individuals in the HRS, and finds that it is possible to explain observed low levels of 
annuitization.
37  This suggests that while many of these explanations are inadequate, on their 
own, to explain limited annuity demand, the combination of multiple factors may have more 
success.  However, this paper also confirms that annuity demand should be higher for single 
individuals than for couples.  One implication of this is that we should observe individuals 
choosing to annuitized upon the death of a spouse, and yet we do not.  Further, other research 
finds no significant difference between single and married individuals in terms of their likelihood 
of choosing the lump sum or the Social Security annuity.
38   
4.4 Bequests  
  Naturally, if a person wishes to leave an inheritance to their children, and if an annuity 
product has no value at death, then the individual will not find it optimal to annuitize all of their 
wealth.  This is why the classic “full annuitization” result requires that there be no bequest 
motive.
39  There are two problems, however, with viewing bequest motives as the answer to the 
annuity puzzle.  First, while bequests clearly lead one away from the full annuitization result, it 
does not mean that individuals will not value partial annuitization.  Indeed, under certain 
assumptions, an individual will simply wish to divide their wealth between “own consumption” 
and “heirs’ consumption” and then fully annuitized the “own consumption” piece.  The value of 
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annuitizing the own consumption part of one’s wealth would be particularly important if the 
individual (or, depending on the bequest function, the individual’s children) are risk averse over 
the size of the bequest.  The reason is that, in the absence of annuitization, the size of the bequest 
becomes a draw from a very disperse distribution – for example, the bequest might be quite large 
if the individual dies young, but quite small if the individual dies at age 95.  
  Second, the empirical evidence in favor of bequest motives mattering for marginal 
annuity decisions is essentially non-existent, at least in the widely used Health and Retirement 
Survey.  For example, one study found that self-reported measures of the strength of the bequest 
motive could not explain intentions about the likelihood of annuitizing DC account balances at 
retirement.
40  Another found that older adults with children are equally likely to annuitize as 
older adults with no children.
41  Yet another study found that proxies for bequests, such as the 
number of children or whether the respondent has a will, are not correlated with one’s stated 
preference for Social Security annuity versus a lump-sum.
42   
Bequest motives are sometimes also posited as an explanation for the frequency with 
which individuals purchase annuities with period certain guarantees.  This explanation also 
seems unsatisfactory, however, due to the odd distribution of bequests that results from such a 
contract.  Suppose, for example, that an individual purchased an annuity with a monthly payout 
of $1,000, and a 10-year period certain guarantee.  If the person dies immediately after 
purchasing the annuity, the beneficiary receives 120 payments of $1,000.  If the annuitant dies 
after one year, the beneficiary receives only 108 payments of $1,000.  At the end of 10 years, the 
beneficiary receives nothing.  Standard parameterizations of a bequest motive (whether a “warm 
glow” model or an altruistic model) have difficulty explaining why this particular distribution of 
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bequests would be optimal.  If there is any risk aversion over the size of the bequest, it is easy to 
show that a guarantee is dominated by purchasing a $1,000 per month annuity with no guarantee 
and using the savings from the reduced annuity premium to make an immediate gift to the 
beneficiary.  Indeed, if there is any load paid on the guarantee, even a risk neutral recipient 
would prefer the immediate gift.       
4.5 Incomplete annuity markets 
Recent theoretical work shows that as long as markets are complete, full annuitization is 
optimal.
43  In reality, existing annuity markets in the U.S. and elsewhere are far from complete: 
most of the life annuity products that are sold today offer a fixed nominal payout, which leaves 
individuals exposed to other risks, such as from inflation or unexpected medical expenditures.   
  Inflation risk arises because most privately available annuity products are fixed in 
nominal terms.  Simulation work shows that under a specific process for inflation, a moderately 
risk averse consumer would find nominal annuities less attractive than inflation-indexed 
annuities.
44  However, it is difficult to conclude that the lack of inflation protection is the major 
culprit for the lack of annuity demand.  Empirically, we know that when inflation-indexed 
annuities are provided – such as through TIAA-CREF’s inflation-linked bond account, or 
through the CPI-indexed product offered by Vanguard / AIG – demand does not suddenly 
increase.  Further, in the U.K. where inflation linked annuities have been widely available for 
many years, they represent a very small share of the market.
45  Also, when individuals are given 
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the opportunity to choose between an inflation indexed Social Security annuity and a lump sum, 
3 out of 5 individuals prefer the lump sum payment.
46   
A second problem with incomplete markets is that most annuity contracts are structured 
in a manner that imposes constraints on the degree of liquidity provided.  It is generally not 
possible to borrow against the future value of an annuity, or to alter the timing of annuity payouts 
once a contract has commenced.  Reversing an annuity, such as by selling it to a third-party 
buyer, is quite costly and often is not possible.   
Concerns about liquidity often arise in the context of health care expenditures.  Health 
expenditures are highly uncertain, not fully insured, and can be quite large especially at older 
ages.  If expenditures are concentrated very late in life, then because annuities are able to provide 
a higher level of income in the years prior to the shock, annuities might be an effective way to 
save for such expenditures.
47  Alternatively, if the expenditures come early in life, they may well 
reduce the value of annuities.  Several papers analyze the role of medical expenditure shocks and 
find that they tend to reduce annuity demand.
48  Of course, forgoing annuitization is an inferior 
strategy to buying both annuities and insurance against the shocks, such as long-term care 
insurance in the case of nursing homes.  Similarly, one could offer a product that combines 
annuities and long-term care into a single product, which in addition to providing both types of 
insurance also has the potential benefit of improving pricing due to offsetting forms of adverse 
selection.
49  Whether this approach would work depends in part on whether individuals will find 
the long-term care benefits valuable in their own right.  For example, Medicaid imposes a large 
                                                 
46 Brown, Casey and Mitchell (2007). 
47 See Davidoff, Brown and Diamond (2005). 
48 For example, see Sinclair and Smetters (2004) and Turra and Mitchell (2005). 
49 This idea has been suggested by Murtaugh et al (2001).   19
implicit tax on the purchase of private long-term care contracts, and to the extent this limits the 
market, this implicit tax would afflict combination products as well.
50         
A more general problem with blaming the limited annuity market size on the 
incompleteness of the product space is that it begs the question of why insurance companies are 
not providing a richer mix of products in the first place.  In some cases, it is easy to trace the 
blame to institutional barriers, such as the difficulty of obtaining level tax treatment of the 
combination annuity plus long-term care product.
51  Similarly, it is understandable that many 
insurance companies have historically been reluctant to offer inflation-indexed annuities due to 
the lack of securities with which to hedge their inflation exposure.  With the introduction of TIPS 
in the late 1990s, followed more recently by the “stripping” of the principal and interest from 
TIPS into separate securities, a few insurance companies have begun creating inflation indexed 
products.  In many other cases, however, the market has been very slow to evolve despite the 
lack of any obvious external impediment to innovation.  For example, aside from TIAA-CREF, 
insurers have been somewhat slow in providing lifetime annuity payouts linked to risky asset 
portfolios, such as stock indices.  Another example is the limited availability of true deferred 
payout annuity contracts, in which an individual contributes gradually over time in exchange for 
a life contingent payout that starts at some future date in exchange for forfeiting the money if one 
dies prior to the payout date.   
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5. Possible Behavioral Hypotheses 
  In recent years, the insights from psychology have increasingly been used to explain 
consumer behavior that deviates from what standard economic models would suggest in a very 
wide range of contexts.  Just within the area of retirement planning, numerous papers have 
demonstrated the power of “behavioral economics” to explain savings rates, 401(k) plan 
participation rates and contribution levels, portfolio decisions and much more.   
  The literature on applying behavioral economics to the annuitization decision has yet to 
emerge.
52  Nonetheless, there are several reasons to believe that our understanding of annuity 
decisions will likely be informed by research in this area.  First, the mixed success of explaining 
annuitization behavior in a fully rational context suggests that other factors are at play.  Second, 
the insights from behavioral economics have been very influential in other aspects of the 
retirement and household finance literatures, and there is little reason to believe that if consumers 
are exhibiting psychological biases during their work lives that they will instantly switch to 
becoming fully rational optimizers at the point of retirement.  Finally, anecdotal evidence (e.g., 
conversations with financial services providers, financial planners, and consumers), as well as 
some industry research, provides reason to believe that behavioral considerations loom large.   
  In this section, I outline an incomplete list of possible behavioral hypotheses that appear 
to be worth exploring in future research.  While there are several research programs that are 
starting to apply behavioral economics to the annuity decision, few results are yet available, and 
thus it is too early to know which insights, if any, will prove most powerful and robust.  As such, 
the discussion that follows is necessarily more speculative.   
5.1 Complexity and financial literacy 
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  Determining how to provide for a sustainable retirement income stream in the face of 
uncertainty is a complex task, especially when the annuity product space is extremely confusing 
(such as the majority of products called “annuities” not providing any life-contingent payouts).  
In general, complexity and information problems may be a rational barrier to annuitization if the 
transactions costs associated with obtaining the necessary information are sufficiently high.  In 
this context, however, where the potential welfare gains from optimizing one’s retirement 
income plan are quite large, it is unlikely that consumers are making a fully rational decision to 
forgo educating themselves about annuities because of the perceived costs of doing so. 
  More likely, the average individual may simply lack the financial sophistication to make 
a fully informed decision about payouts.
53  Evidence abounds about the lack of financial 
sophistication in the population.
54  In the context of annuities, research suggests that, conditional 
on education, individuals who are able to answer a simple question about compound interest are 
significantly more likely to choose the Social Security annuity over the lump-sum option.
55   
   Complexity is one of several hypotheses as to why default options have been found to 
have such power in influencing a wide range of behaviors associated with retirement planning.  
There is some evidence that defaults influence behavior in the wealth decumulation phase: in 
1984, the federal government began requiring a spouse’s notarized signature if a married retiree 
wished to opt-out of the joint-and-survivor annuity and take a single-life annuity instead, a 
change that increased joint-and-survivor annuitization of 5 to 10 percentage points.
56  Of course, 
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complexity is only one possible explanation for the importance of defaults, but all of them rely 
on behavioral, rather than fully rational, insights.
57   
5.2 Mental Accounting and Loss Aversion: “Annuities are a Gamble”: 
  In focus groups conducted by the American Council of Life Insurers, some participants 
viewed the purchase of an immediate annuity as “gambling on their lives.”
58  This perspective is 
difficult to reconcile with the standard model of a life cycle consumer whose lifetime utility 
derives from their consumption each period and for whom the elimination of the financial aspect 
of mortality risk is a form of insurance.   
  Mental accounting and prospect theory’s loss aversion concept may help to explain this 
finding.  Rather than evaluating the annuity as part of an overall optimization exercise, 
individuals may use a narrow framing along the lines of “will I live long enough to make back 
my initial investment?”
59  If the question is framed in this manner, it is easy to then see why the 
product is viewed as a risky gamble.  Without the annuity, the individual has $100,000 for 
certain.  With the annuity, in contrast, there is some positive probability that the individual will 
receive only a few thousand dollars in income (if he were to die within a few months), some 
probability that the individual will receive far more than $100,000 (if he lives well past life 
expectancy), and a full distribution of possibilities in between.  This line of reasoning suggests 
that if one applies the cumulative prospect theory approach to a narrow framing of the annuity, 
annuities do not look attractive because the “losses” from the annuity (if one dies young) loom 
larger in the individual’s value function than do the potential “gains” from living a long time.
60   
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In addition to providing a possible explanation of limited demand, proponents of this view 
argue that this can explain the prevalence of guarantees, which are essentially a way to hold less 
of the “risky” annuity.  Of course, the use of prospect theory to explain why people purchase 
guarantees along with their annuity suffers from the difficulty that individuals who approach 
annuities from this perspective would prefer not to annuitize at all.  There are a number of 
questions that need more research attention in this context, such as determining which reference 
point consumers use to evaluate gains and losses when evaluating an annuity.  Nonetheless, this 
model provides a useful starting point for thinking about these issues.   
5.3 Misleading Heuristics: “Insurance is for Bad Events”
61 
An economist’s view of insurance is that it is a mechanism for transferring resources from 
states of low marginal utility of income (i.e., times when additional money is less valuable) to 
states of high marginal utility of income (i.e., times when additional money is more valuable).  
An annuity does this by transferring resources from states of the world in which an individual 
has died young (and thus has a low marginal utility of income) to states in which they have lived 
past their expected lifespan and therefore presumably have a high marginal utility of income. 
Casual empiricism suggests, however, that many non-economists use a different framing for 
buying insurance, such as, “I buy insurance against bad events.”  In other words, many 
individuals appear to buy insurance to pay off when the level of utility is low, rather than when 
the marginal utility of income is high.  In many cases, low utility and high marginal utility 
correspond, which is why this heuristic works well in cases such as life insurance, health 
insurance, casualty insurance, disability insurance, and so forth.  However, there are also cases 
when this heuristic fails because marginal utility may be high even when utility is high, or vice 
versa.  An example of a “high utility, high marginal utility” state might be the news that your 
                                                 
61 I thank David Laibson for first suggesting this heuristic, and Richard Zeckhauser for additional insights on it.   24
child has just been accepted into a very expensive private school: while you are happy with the 
outcome, you now place a high value on coming up with the marginal dollars to pay tuition.  An 
example of a “low utility, low marginal utility” state might be the death of a child: the outcome 
itself is devastating, and you may value the marginal dollar less.  Interestingly, we do not 
observe many insurance contracts written to insure against the good news of a child being 
accepted at Harvard, whereas it is quite easy to find examples of life insurance companies 
specifically targeting parents to purchase life insurance on their children.   
To the extent that living a long time is viewed as a good or high utility outcome, this 
insurance heuristic may lead them to forego annuities.  Of course, a good marketing strategy 
should be able to overcome this objection by re-framing the outcome as a negative event, along 
the lines of insuring against “being a widow living in extreme poverty because you outlived your 
money.”  Whether such framing effects are really important remains to be seen, however, as 
there is virtually no empirical evidence to date that sheds any light on this hypothesis. 
5.4 Regret Aversion: “I Should Not Have Bought that Annuity”   
A common explanation proffered by financial planners as to why their clients do not like 
annuities, and for the popularity of period certain guarantees for those that do buy them, is the 
desire to avoid regret.  One possible response to this notion is that the time in which the 
individual should most regret the annuity purchase is after they are dead, at which time the 
capacity for regret seems speculative at best.  This response, however, ignores the possibility that 
if an individual converts the majority of their retirement savings into an annuity and then 
subsequently learns they have only one year to live, the potential for regret during that final year 
of life may be significant.  Even if the probability of this outcome is very small, individuals may 
inflate the probability in making the annuity decision.  For example, research in psychology has   25
shown that events that are more easily imagined (e.g., such as dying right after an annuity 
purchase) are over weighted in the decision process.
62   
However, a formal application of the regret aversion model to annuities does not necessarily 
imply that individuals will not value annuities.  In a study that examines insurance decisions 
within a formal model of regret aversion, researchers find that regret aversion leads individuals 
away from extreme outcomes, meaning that regret averse individuals are less likely to fully 
insure but also less likely to forego insurance completely.
63  In this context, just as individuals 
might regret the decision to purchase an annuity, a regret averse individual might also fear the 
possibility of living to age 110 after having failed to purchase one.  More research needs to be 
done to determine whether or not regret aversion matters for the annuity purchase decision.   
5.5 “The Illusion of Control” 
One recent industry study finds that “loss of control” of one’s assets is the most commonly 
cited disadvantage of annuitization.
64  To the extent that individuals are really expressing a 
concern about liquidity, there is a rational element to this objection.  As noted earlier, the “costly 
reversibility” feature of life annuities and the difficulty borrowing against future annuity streams 
means that individuals who may face uninsured expenditure shocks may not want to fully 
annuitized.  It may also be rational to be concerned about control if one is concerned about 
entering into a long-term contract with an insurance company that may go bankrupt sometime 
during the life of the annuity contract.
65  However, the strength of the objections often registered 
about control suggests that there is something deeper than a rational concern about liquidity.   
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It is possible that these objections may be related to the large psychology literature on the 
“illusion of control,” or the tendency of individuals to believe they can control outcomes even 
when they have no such control.
66  Individuals may well believe that they have more control over 
their financial future by holding wealth rather than by receiving income.  It is worth noting that 
during one’s working life, much of the financial advice that one receives emphasizes individual 
choice and control.  Thus, it would not be surprising to think that individuals would have a 
difficult time handing over their wealth to an insurance company in exchange for a monthly 
income stream over which they have little control.   
5.6 Other Behavioral Factors 
There are numerous other potential behavioral explanations as well, including models of 
ambiguity aversion (e.g., people do not even know the relevant probabilities of survival), models 
that suggest that individuals do not like to think about unpleasant events (e.g., dying young, or 
being old but poor), and models focusing on how individuals discount the future (e.g., a 
hyperbolic discounting model).
 67  It is also possible that “framing” effects are quite important in 
this context.  As with the other hypotheses outlined above, however, much more research is 
needed to determine which of these factors, if any, are empirically relevant. 
 
6. The Future of Annuitization 
6.1 New products
68 
With nearly 80 million baby boomers approaching retirement, the issue of how to convert 
wealth into a secure stream of retirement income is increasingly on the minds of individuals, 
insurance companies, and policy makers.  In the last few years, insurance companies have started 
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introducing several new products that focus on the payout phase, a small subset of which will be 
described below.  The diversity of approaches being followed in the industry suggests that there 
is not unanimity about the underlying cause of limited annuitization.  As the market evolves in 
the coming years, it will provide us with additional information to assess the underlying 
determinants of, and barriers to, annuitization.   
6.1.1 Deferred payouts    
  Several companies have begun to offer products that are designed to provide life annuity 
payments that start at some future date.
69 At least one company (Hartford) has structured a 
product to be similar to having a DB option within a 401(k) plan: as a person contributes, they 
are buying a guaranteed amount of future annuity income.  One possible advantage of this 
approach is that because the individual is gradually buying units of income, rather than 
accumulating wealth per se, participants may not face the same psychological barrier of 
converting a large accumulated stock of wealth into income at the time of retirement.   
  A related product was introduced by MetLife in 2004.  The idea behind this product is 
that a consumer at age 65 can use a small portion of their wealth to buy an annuity that does not 
begin paying out until age 85.  In this sense, the product feels more like insurance in that it pays 
off only in the event that the person lives a long time.  Because payouts commencing 20 years in 
the future are being discounted by both interest rates and non-trivial mortality rates, it appears 
relatively “cheap” to buy income at older ages.  By providing insurance against outliving one’s 
resources, this product captures a disproportionate share of the welfare gains from 
annuitization.
70  One way to view it is that it is a form of partial annuitization where the 
annuitization is concentrated in those periods where the mortality credits are the largest.  While 
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these products seem to be generating a fair amount of interest in the financial planning 
community, only time will tell if they have a major impact on the market.   
6.1.2 Guaranteed minimum withdrawals for life  
  As noted earlier, variable annuity products have traditionally been used as asset 
accumulation devices, with little attention paid to the payout features.  Recently, however, a 
“new generation of variable annuity products (is) proliferating in the market.”
71  An increasingly 
popular feature of these contracts is a guaranteed minimum withdrawal benefit (GMWB) that 
guarantees a minimum level of withdrawals over one’s lifetime.  Because these contracts 
typically guarantee that the individual will receive a fixed percentage (e.g., 5%) of the account 
balance at a point in time (e.g., a particular birthday, a high-water mark, etc), they are essentially 
providing the owner with an annuity floor below which the income cannot fall.  These contracts 
typically provide individuals with a reasonably high level of liquidity (e.g., they may modify 
their withdrawal amount, or even cash in the product) as well as some control over the portfolio 
allocation.  GMWB were available on nearly 80 percent of the variable annuities sold in the first 
quarter of 2006, up from 44 percent in 2003.
72  To what extent individuals take advantage of this 
annuity feature after retirement remains to be seen.     
6.1.3 Annuities with liquidity 
  At least one insurance company that offers a fixed life annuity with an option to 
withdraw, on a one-time only basis, up to 30 percent of the expected value of the remaining 
annuity payments based on mortality rates at the time of purchase.  This option is limited to 
being exercised only on the 5
th, 10
th, or 15
th anniversary of the first payment or upon a 
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“significant, non-medical loss.”
73  It is not yet clear whether the potential for adverse selection in 
this context has affected the pricing in a significant way. 
  Another idea that has been floated is that of combining an annuity with long-term care 
insurance as a way of addressing concerns about liquidity in the context of long-term care 
expenditure risk.
74  The idea of the product is that it would provide life annuity benefits with a 
significant “pop-up” benefit (e.g., additional cash payments) when the annuitant meets the 
benefit triggers typically associated with long-term care insurance policies.  While the Pension 
Protection Act of 2006 provided this combination product with some tax benefits beginning in 
2010, it is too early to know whether this market will evolve in a substantial way.   
6.2 Public policy towards annuitization 
  Whether policymakers should be actively encouraging annuitization is unclear, as it 
depends on why individuals are choosing not to annuitize on their own.  If the observed lack of 
annuitization represents optimal behavior by fully rational individuals, then the scope for 
welfare-increasing government intervention is more limited.  Even if individuals are failing to 
fully optimize as a result of behavioral biases, it is not clear that government intervention is 
necessary or desirable in overcoming it, as private sector annuity providers may have sufficient 
incentive to determine how to promote annuitization on their own. 
  On the other hand, given that pensions and insurance are heavily regulated at the federal 
and state level respectively, there is no question that the government is already influencing the 
annuity landscape, and not always for the better.  For example, an important reason for the lack 
of annuities in 401(k) plans is that legal advisors “strongly advise their clients against them.  In 
their view, annuities expose plan sponsors to significant and long-term risk of liability.  And plan 
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sponsors, more often than not, heed their advice.”
75  While plan sponsors are under no fiduciary 
risk for choosing not to provide an annuity option, the decision to offer an annuity creates such 
risk due to a provision requiring plan sponsors to choose the “safest annuity available.”  At a 
minimum, it would seem desirable that the government not discourage annuitization.  
Fortunately, this risk may be mitigated in the future, as Section 625 of the Pension Protection Act 
of 2006 directs the Department of Labor to issue regulations within one year that would clarify 
that when a fiduciary selects an annuity as an optional form of distribution from a defined 
contribution plan, the decision will no longer be subject to the “safest available” provision.
76 
  The Pension Protection Act also took significant steps to encourage the use of default 
options in the accumulation phase of 401(k) plans.  Given the demonstrated power of default 
options, it is perhaps worth considering whether firms ought to be required to offer an annuity as 
a default payout option.  Structuring an optimal annuity default would arguably be more 
challenging than designing a default for contributions due to the issues of irreversibility, but such 
issues could likely be addressed by allowing for a richer set of annuity options (e.g., gradual 
annuitization, liquidity options, etc).   
 
7.  Conclusions and Implications for Financial Education 
It has been more than two decades since Nobel Laureate Franco Modigliani stated that 
the reasons individuals do not annuitize more are still “ill-understood.”  Since that time, 
numerous scholars have contributed to a significant increase in our understanding of how annuity 
markets operate, the decisions that individuals make, and the implications of these decisions for 
individual welfare.  Nonetheless, while we have a much greater understanding of how we think 
                                                 
75 Perun (2004).  
76 Borzi and Patterson (2007).   31
consumers ought to optimally behave and of how they actually do behave with respect to annuity 
decisions, we still do not have a fully developed sense of why they behave the way that they do.   
The answers to these questions are critical for understanding the appropriateness and/or 
potential efficacy of financial education in this area.  If future research were to show that 
consumer aversion to annuities is well-informed and rational, then there is minimal scope for 
financial education or other forms of government intervention to alter outcomes (nor in this case 
would altering outcomes be desirable).  If research confirms that consumer aversion is driven 
primarily by complexity, confusion, or various psychological biases, then the next question is 
whether scarce societal resources are better spent on financial education or on creating products 
and policies that mandate or encourage annuitization by appealing to or overcoming such biases.  
Until we have a better understanding of why consumers act as if they place so little value on 
annuitization, it will remain unclear whether individual and social welfare will be enhanced by 
policies that promote annuitization, or even which policies would be successful at doing so.  As 
such, the economics and psychology of the annuitization decision remains a very fruitful area for 
additional research.   
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